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Sevilleja v Marex Financial Ltd: Reflective Loss and the
Autonomy of Company Law
Jonathan Hardman∗
In Sevilleja vMarex Financial Ltd the Supreme Court considered the ambit of the prohibition on
a shareholder recovering losses from third parties for the reduction in the value of their shares
or loss of dividend income arising from a wrong suffered by the company. This prohibition
on ‘reflective loss’ had been growing in scope in recent years, leading to a lack of clarity as to
whether it is taxonomically situated in company law or in private law.The majority in this case
situated the prohibition firmly within company law.This note argues that the majority judgment
did not go far enough and explores the impact of this case on company law more broadly.
INTRODUCTION
‘Reflective loss’ is a company law1 term for resulting loss suffered by sharehold-
ers when a company suffers a wrong. It can manifest by reduction in the value
of shares or reduction in the dividend income caused by this wrong.2 Company
law has long held that the company is the correct party to sue for a wrong done
to it (and therefore the shareholders are not).3 Similarly, it has held that share-
holders are prohibited from recovering reflective loss.4 This principle will be
referred to as “the prohibition” throughout this case commentary. The extent
of the prohibition, however, was not clear. Three key issues were unresolved.
First, the boundaries of the prohibition were unclear: whether it only affects
shareholders, or equally applies to other constituencies.5 Second, whether the
∗Lecturer in International Commercial Law, School of Law, University of Edinburgh. The author
is grateful to the anonymous peer reviewer for their comments on the prior version of this case
commentary. All errors and omissions remain the sole responsibility of the author.
1 We use the term ‘company law’ widely in this case commentary, to include all business organ-
isations. It has been correctly pointed out that a number of authorities in this field do not
arise in the context of companies, but in the context of other forms of legal entities such
as trade unions – see P.L. Davies, ‘Reflecting on “Sevilleja v Marex Financial”’ Oxford Busi-
ness Law Blog, 5 August 2020 at https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/business-law-blog/blog/2020/08/
reflecting-sevilleja-v-marex-financial (last accessed 7 May 2021).
2 See G.Morse et al, Palmer’s Company Law (London: Sweet & Maxwell, Release 168, 2020) para
8.3719;P.L.Davies and S.Worthington,Gower Principles of Modern Company Law (London:Sweet
& Maxwell, 10th ed, 2016) paras 17.34-17.38.
3 Foss v Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461.
4 Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd (No 2) [1982] Ch 204.
5 Gardner v Parker [2004] EWCA Civ 781, [2004] 6 WLUK 502; B.Hannigan, ‘Drawing bound-
aries between derivative claims and unfairly prejudicial petitions’ [2009] Journal of Business Law
606;P.W.Lee, ‘Creditors’ claims for reflective loss’ [2008] Journal of Business Law 479; J.Mukwiri,
‘The no reflective loss principle’ (2005) 26 The Company Lawyer 304.
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prohibition meant that the shareholder is deemed to suffer no loss, or whether
the shareholder suffers loss but is prohibited from recovering it. Third, the
link between the prohibition and wider private law remedies was uncertain
– whether it is a discrete part of company law, or whether it is based on wider
English law principles for remedies in respect of a concurrent wrong.6
These questions have been answered by the Supreme Court in Sevilleja v
Marex Financial Ltd7 (Sevilleja).Here, the issue was whether the prohibition also
applied to loss suffered by creditors, and if not then why not. This case com-
mentary discusses the case and the three judgments issued, then explores two
aspects of its wider implications. First, it explores implications for the prohibi-
tion. Second, it explores wider company law implications.
THE CASE AND ISSUES
The case concerned two BVI companies. Both were controlled by Sevilleja,
who also ultimately owned the shares in them. Sevilleja disputed the facts ac-
cepted by the court.8 These facts were that Sevilleja used these companies to
trade in foreign exchange. Both companies entered into contracts with Marex.
In 2013, Marex obtained English judgments against these two companies for
US$5.5m, plus costs of £1.65m. The judge sent all parties a confidential draft
judgment on 19 July 2013, and formalised the orders for payment on 25 July
2013.Starting on 19 July 2013,Sevilleja procured that the two companies alien-
ated US$9.5m to accounts that he controlled.As at the end of August 2013, the
aggregate total gross assets of both companies was under US$5,000.These alien-
ations were said to have the express object of preventing Marex from receiving
any funds due under the judgment, and breached duties owed by Sevilleja to
the companies.
In December 2013, Sevilleja put both companies into insolvent liquida-
tion. The companies owed over $30m to parties related to Sevilleja.Marex was
the only non-insider creditor. The liquidator had not taken any action against
Sevilleja for these breaches. A US court held that the liquidation was merely ‘a
device to thwart enforcement’ of the English judgments, and that Sevilleja con-
trolled the BVI liquidator.9 Marex therefore sued Sevilleja in tort for, amongst
other things, intentionally causing it to suffer loss by unlawful means. Sevilleja
admitted that some of the costs claimed against him did not fall under the
prohibition. However, he argued that some of Marex’s loss as creditor of the
6 See C. Mitchell, ‘Shareholders’ claims for reflective loss’ (2004) 120 Law Quar-
terly Review 457; A. Tettenborn, ‘Creditors and reflective loss – a bar too far?’
(2019) 135 Law Quarterly Review 182; P. Watts, ‘Marex Financial Ltd v Sevilleja:
Some Commentary in Response to Paul Davies’s Blog Contribution’ Oxford Business
Law Blog, 7 August 2020 at https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/business-law-blog/blog/2020/08/
marex-financial-ltd-v-sevilleja-some-commentary-response-paul-daviess (last accessed 7 May
2021).
7 Sevilleja v Marex Financial Ltd [2020] UKSC 31; [2021] AC 39.
8 ibid at [15].
9 In re Creative Finance Ltd (In Liquidation) et alUnited States Bankruptcy Court, Southern District
of New York, 13 January 2016 (unreported), as quoted in Sevilleja, n 7 above at [20].
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companies was purely reflective of the loss suffered by the companies, and as
such fell within the prohibition. This was the issue before the Supreme Court:
whether the loss caused to Marex qua creditor of the companies fell within
the prohibition. This issue arises because case law has resulted in a dramatic
growth of the ambit of reflective loss.10 Three judgments were delivered in the
case: Lord Reed (with whom Lady Black and Lord Lloyd-Jones agreed), Lord
Hodge, and Lord Sales (with whom Lady Hale and Lord Kitchin agreed). Lord
Hodge ultimately agreed with Lord Reed, but wanted to ‘add a few comments
about the central role of company law in the Court of Appeal’s judgment in
the Prudential case which is the fons et origo of the principle.’11 We will refer
to Lord Reed’s judgment as the majority,12 and Lord Sales’ as the minority. All
judgments agreed that Marex’s qua creditor losses were not caught by the pro-
hibition.As such,Marex could continue their claim.However, the reasoning for
such outcome differed between judgments.To explore the different reasons,we
need to trace the development of the prohibition.
The prohibition originated in Prudential v Newman Industries13 (Prudential).
There, a company’s directors sold the company’s assets to a third party at an
undervalue. The directors then obtained shareholder ratification of the sale at
a meeting convened on the basis of a circular which contained a fraudulent
misrepresentation about the transaction. Prudential was a minority shareholder
who brought a derivative claim against the company.The derivative claim allows
a shareholder to pursue a claim against a wrongdoing director in the name of
the company, with any recovery being received by the company rather than
the shareholder.14 It has been criticised as being inaccessible to shareholders,
and of limited value even if successful.15 As a fall-back option, in the event
that their derivative claim was unsuccessful, Prudential also raised a personal
action in respect of the loss in value of their shares arising as a result of the
directors’ wrong.16 Prudential offered no evidence for this loss in addition to
the evidence they provided for their derivative claim.17 The Court of Appeal
held that Prudential could not recover the loss of the drop in their value of
shares, as
the shareholder does not suffer any personal loss. His only ‘loss’ is through the
company, in the diminution in the value of the net assets of the company, in which
he has (say) a 3 per cent. shareholding. The plaintiff’s shares are merely a right of
participation in the company on the terms of the articles of association. The shares
10 See Tettenborn, n 6 above.
11 Sevilleja, n 7 above at [95].
12 Plurality has also, and potentially more accurately, been deployed – see S. Laing, ‘Reflective loss
in the UK Supreme Court’ (2020) 79 Cambridge Law Journal 411.
13 n 4 above.
14 Companies Act 2006, ss 260-264; J. Armour, ‘Derivative actions: a framework for decisions’
(2019) 135 Law Quarterly Review 412; D. Kershaw, ‘The rule in Foss v Harbottle is dead: long
live the rule in Foss v Harbottle’ [2015] Journal of Business Law 274.
15 For example, see A.M. Gray, ‘The statutory derivative claim: An outmoded superfluousness?’
(2012) 33 The Company Lawyer 295.
16 Prudential, n 4 above.
17 Sevilleja, n 7 above at [134] and [148].
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themselves, his right of participation, are not directly affected by the wrongdoing.
The plaintiff still holds all the shares as his own.18
The judgment used an example of a company whose sole asset was £100,000
cash in a box. If a wrongdoer fraudulently obtains the key, and steals the money,
the company suffers a loss, and any loss to the shareholder is merely their pro-
portion of that loss. As such, there is no separate action for the shareholder.19
This example has been heavily criticised as being artificial.20 Nevertheless,Pru-
dential laid the clear rule that shareholders could not recover for loss arising
due to a drop in the value of their shares or a loss of dividend income where
the company also had an actionable wrong. The origin of this rule, though,
had two potential taxonomical groundings. First, that it arose because the com-
pany was the correct party to sue, and therefore descended from the company
law rule of Foss v Harbottle21 and second, that the issue was that the com-
pany and shareholder’s claims overlapped. This approach rendered recovery of
the shareholder’s loss a double recovery from the wrongdoer, with policy rea-
sons to prefer the company’s claim over the shareholder’s.22 If the former, then
the prohibition was a neat part of company law that arose for any interac-
tion between shareholder loss and company loss. If the latter, then the prohi-
bition was part of the wider private law of damages, and was only triggered
where such loss was inherently overlapping and risked double recovery for the
same wrong. Similarly, if the former, the shareholder has no cause of action;
if the latter then the shareholder has a cause of action but is prevented from
recovering it.23
The position became more complicated in Johnson v Gore Wood24 (Johnson),
where a company’s solicitors were negligent in respect of a property owned
by the company. Johnson owned ‘virtually’ all the shares.25 Johnson sued for a
number of heads, one being payments to Mr Johnson’s pension policy which
could not be paid by the company due to the solicitors’ negligence. Lord Bing-
ham identified three categories. First, where the loss is suffered by the com-
pany as a breach of a duty owed only to the company, then the shareholder
cannot sue due to the prohibition on the recovery of reflective loss.26 Sec-
ond, if the company suffers loss but has no action, the shareholder can sue to
18 Prudential, n 4 above, 223.
19 ibid, 223.
20 Mitchell, n 6 above, 459; P. Koh, ‘The Shareholder’s Personal Claim: Allowing Recovery for
Reflective Losses’ (2011) 23 Singapore Academy of Law Journal 863, 866-867.
21 Foss v Harbottle, n 3 above.
22 M.J.Sterling, ‘The Theory and Policy of Shareholder Actions in Tort’ (1987) 50 MLR 468; J.L.S.
Lin, ‘Barring recovery for diminution in value of shares on the reflective loss principle’ (2007)
66 Cambridge Law Journal 537.
23 Compare the position of the majority in Sevilleja, n 7 above at [80] with the position of the
minority at [144].
24 Johnson v Gore Wood & Co (No 1) [2002] 2 AC 1, [2001] All ER 481; P.Watts, ‘The shareholder
as co-promisee’ (2001) 117 Law Quarterly Review 388.
25 Johnson ibid, 56.
26 Sevilleja, n 7 above at [41]. This is based on Heron International Ltd v Lord Grade [1983] BCLC
244 and Stein v Blake [1998] 1 All ER 724.
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recover reflective loss if they have an action.27 Third, where the company and
the shareholder suffer independent losses caused by independent breaches, both
can sue.28 In both judgments issued, recovery of the missed payments to John-
son’s pension fund was caught by the prohibition. Confusion arises, though,
from Lord Millett’s judgment, which was based on discussion of double recov-
ery.29 If the issue is ultimately one of double recovery, then it is acknowledged
that the shareholder has a claim, but there are restrictions on how that claim
can be exercised. Such restrictions are justified as there is an established method
for distributing assets of a company (both as dividends and on winding up)
which would otherwise be circumvented by a single shareholder recovering
that loss. Under this logic, these restrictions must, though, be limited to where
shareholder recovery would cause double recovery.30 As such,viewing the prin-
ciple in the second taxonomical grounding, not all loss to shareholders arising
from the diminution in value of shares will be caught by the prohibition. Lord
Millett grounded his discussion in the context of shareholders.31 However, his
logic is not limited to shareholders – if the prohibition arises where (and only
where) recovery of such loss risks double recovery, and such double recovery
threatens diversion of assets away from the corporate fund32 to one participant
in that fund, then non-shareholder claims which cause the same issues should
be subject to the same rule. If a wrong to a company resulted in a creditor not
being paid by the company, then this logic must also apply to any claim that the
creditor had against the wrongdoer.As such, Lord Millett’s reasoning grounded
the prohibition more fully in the general law of damages, providing taxonomic
coherence with private law.However, this reasoning meant that the prohibition
need not apply to all claims for reflective loss by shareholders, and could apply
to non-shareholders.
These issues were exemplified in further cases – in Giles v Rhind33 (Giles),
an individual was a director of a company and a lead shareholder. A third party
breached duties owed to the company and to the individual. The company
could not afford to sue due to the breach, and so dropped their claim, but the
individual was allowed to sue for all claims, including a loss of value of their
shares, on the grounds that denying this would be ‘unjust’.34 Conversely, in
27 Sevilleja ibid at [41]. This is based on Lee v Sheard [1956] 1 QB 192;George Fischer (Great Britain)
Ltd v Multi Construction Ltd [1995] 1 BCLC 260, and Gerber Garment Technology Inc v Lectra
Systems Ltd [1997] RPC 443.
28 Sevilleja ibid at [41]. This was based on the cases cited above, but also RP Howard Ltd vWoodman
Matthews & Co [1983] BCLC 117.
29 Johnson, n 24 above, 57, 62.
30 Lord Millett’s argument was used in the case of Peak Hotels and Resorts Ltd v Tarek Investments Ltd
[2015] EWHC 3048 (Ch); [2015] 9 WLUK 387 to argue that reflective loss did not apply where
the company was not seeking damages but instead seeking an injunction against the wrongdoer
– see Sevilleja, n 7 above at [53].
31 Johnson, n 24 above, 61-65.
32 S. Watson, ‘The corporate legal entity as a fund’ [2018] Journal of Business Law 467; S. Watson,
‘How the company became an entity: a new understanding of corporate law’ [2015] Journal of
Business Law 120.
33 [2002] EWCA Civ 1428; [2003] Ch 618. See discussion in H.C. Hirt, ‘Companies in general’
[2003] Journal of Business Law 420.
34 The word unjust only appears in the majority opinion in Sevilleja, n 7 above at [69].
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Gardner v Parker35 (Gardner), a shareholder also held a right as a creditor, and
bought the company’s rights to claim against a wrongdoing shareholder and
director.The court held that the prohibition applied in respect of debt owed to
a shareholder. In obiter comments, Lord Neuberger added that the prohibition
would also apply to an employee or creditor who was not a shareholder.36 As a
result of basing the prohibition in the second taxonomical grounding, reflective
loss had morphed into something which at the same time did not apply to all
shareholder claims, and now also applied to non-shareholder claims. As such, it
became part of the law of obligations when interacting with a juridical person.
Tettenborn stated that it ‘promises to distort large areas of the ordinary law of
obligations’, akin to ‘some ghastly legal Japanese knotweed.’37
In Sevilleja v Marex, the Supreme Court therefore had a narrow question
before it and a wider question. The narrow question was whether Marex’s rel-
evant claim was caught by the prohibition – which all answered negatively.The
wider question was, in either case,why. In particular, clarity as to the taxonom-
ical grounding of the rule was required.
The Supreme Court had five ultimate options, three in the first taxonomical
grounding and two in the second. First, on the strong company law approach –
that the prohibition applied to all those interacting with a company – the rule
comes from company law, but applies to all those interacting with the com-
pany. Thus the prohibition would catch employees, creditors, and tort victims
of companies. This result is the extension of the Gardner result, and so causes
Tettenborn’s distortion. It is company law at its most muscular – interacting
with a company, as a matter of company law, distorts your ordinary private law
interactions. As such being a creditor, employee, or tort victim of a company
is inherently different from being a creditor, employee, or tort victim of a sole
trader. This option would bar Marex from claiming.
Second, on the semi-strong company law approach – that the prohibition
applied to all claims held by shareholders – if a third party creditor held a debt,
their recovery of it would not be affected by the prohibition, but if they sold
that claim to a shareholder, then it would be.This also arises conceptually from
company law, but holds that there is something inherent in being a shareholder
of a company which can compromise all claims you have in respect of that com-
pany. This follows Gardner without extending it. As Marex is not a shareholder,
under this option Marex would win.
Third, on the weak company law approach, in which the prohibition only
follows shareholder claims qua shareholder, a transferred debt claim would not
be caught by the prohibition, but a claim linked to the narrow areas of loss of
value of shares, or loss of income in respect of shares, would be. This is also a
matter for company law,but would strip back the law to the position outlined in
Prudential.Once again, under this option Marex would win.Under any of these
three routes, if the prohibition were triggered, it would preclude the relevant
party having a claim against the third party as a matter of company law.
35 Gardner, n 5 above.
36 ibid at [70].
37 Tettenborn, n 6 above, 183.
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Fourth, the strong private law approach would hold that the prohibition
is a subset of the rule on double recovery which can apply to any corporate
constituency. It would thus not be a company law matter at all – instead it is
something that only arises when those interacting with the company have a
double recovery. However, it applies to all interacting with the company, and
not just shareholders. This is the extrapolation of Lord Millett’s approach in
Johnson. It presents a muscular form of private law, as there would be nothing
company-specific about the rule, instead it would be a subset of the private law
rules of double recovery. Thus, if the company pursued the claim, the relevant
constituency would be barred from pursuing their overlapping claim, but if the
company did not then the other constituency would be free to pursue it – as
per Giles v Rhind. As the two BVI companies had not claimed against Sevilleja,
here Marex would be free to do so.
Fifth, the weak private law approach only applies to claims held by share-
holders. Here, these principles were only triggered where the double recovery
applied to a claim from a shareholder. This is grounded in a narrow reading of
Lord Millett’s approach, but it is not clear why this would only apply to one
corporate constituency and not others.38 Here, again,Marex would win.
Thus under four of the five options available to the court,Sevilleja lost.How-
ever, for the clarity of the doctrinal framework in this area, and the interaction
of company law and private law more broadly, it was important that the court
decided not only if Sevilleja won or lost, but if he lost then for which reason.
This issue is one that many jurisdictions grapple with – and there is no universal
jurisdiction-neutral solution to the issue.39
REFLECTIVE LOSS NOW
The Supreme Court’s conclusion that Marex could continue their claim only
means that option one was rejected. The judgments disagreed as to which of
the other four options should be followed. The majority adopted the ‘weak
company law’ approach (option 3).For the majority, double recovery had noth-
ing to do with the reflective loss rule as it is not inevitable that there will be
a corresponding loss to the shareholder arising as a result of a wrong to the
company. The majority did not think that the company failing to pursue the
matter was relevant. They did not consider that the rule could cause any un-
fairness,40 and held that minority shareholders had other remedies available to
them.41 For the majority, the prohibition only applied when faced with losses
suffered by shareholders in their capacity as shareholders in which the company
had its own claim. Lord Reed’s judgment stated ‘[t]he critical point is that the
38 Technically this could be sub-divided into claims held by shareholders qua shareholder and all
claims held by shareholders, but this point has not been elaborated upon.
39 See B. de Jong, ‘Shareholders’ Claims for Reflective Loss: A Comparative Legal Analysis’ (2013)
14 European Business Organization Law Review 97; J. Lasák, ‘Reflective Loss Regulation:A Czech
Anomaly’ (2018) 19 European Business Organization Law Review 161.
40 For a contrary argument, see Koh, n 20 above, 866-867.
41 Sevilleja, n 7 above at [81].
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shareholder has not suffered a loss which is regarded by the law as being sepa-
rate and distinct from the company’s loss’.42 There was no analogous issue for
creditors.43 Thus, for the majority, Prudential and Lord Bingham’s judgment in
Johnson were correct, and everything else that arose afterwards was not.44 For
the majority, the prohibition was narrow, and only applied where the company
had an actionable loss which reduced the amount that the shareholders would
receive as shareholders.45 It reconciled the pension contributions in Johnson as
being the method in which the company’s profit was distributed to Johnson in
a tax efficient way. Had these contributions arisen as a result of employment,
or bonus, or to satisfy a debt, then the prohibition would have been avoided.
The prohibition’s taxonomical grounding, therefore, was purely company law.
By casting it weakly, it cut through Tettenborn’s knotweed to clarify the normal
law of obligations would only be affected in narrow circumstances.
The author agrees with the majority, but they could have gone further and
held that no qua shareholder claims were conceptually possible against third
parties. This is easily extrapolatable from the position of the majority. A large
amount of confusion has arisen in the literature and case law because of generic
reference to claims by shareholders.46 If, instead, the analysis had focused on
financial rights deriving from shares, it is submitted that the position would
have been clearer. Shareholders do not receive much of a legally enforceable
financial right from holding a share. Despite arguments that a shareholder is a
‘mere purchaser of income’,47 they do not enjoy a legal right to a dividend.Only
accumulated, realised, undistributed profits can be distributed.48 Courts have
struck down transactions which have the effect of circumventing these rules,49
and held that these rules cannot be disapplied by companies.50 Shareholders
do not even decide whether a dividend should be made if one is technically
possible.51
The overall result is that receiving a dividend is the same as tipping in a restau-
rant.52 Even when a dividend is declared, it promptly becomes a debt payable
42 ibid at [83].
43 ibid at [84].
44 ibid at [89].
45 ibid at [89].
46 Examples include Sevilleja ibid at [162], [165], [166]; Tettenborn, n 6 above, 186; Lin, n 22 above,
556;Mitchell, n 6 above, 458-460.
47 B.C. Hunt,The Development of the Business Corporation in England 1800-1867 (Cambridge,MA:
Harvard University Press, 1936) 130, as discussed in D.D.Prentice, ‘The Theory of the Firm:Mi-
nority Shareholder Oppression: Sections 459-461 of the Companies Act 1985’ (1988) 8 Oxford
Journal of Legal Studies 55, 60.
48 Companies Act 2006, s 830.
49 For example Aveling Barford Ltd v Perion Ltd [1989] BCLC 626.
50 For example Precision Dippings Limited v Precision Dippings Marketing Ltd, John Anthony Wynne-
Jones and Peter John Leslie David King 1985 WL 1167741.
51 The Companies Act 2006 is silent,and therefore the company’s constitution sets who makes such
a decision. The default articles of association state that directors have to initiate any dividend
decision – The Companies (Model Articles) Regulations 2008 (SI 2008/3229), Sched 1, para
30 for the rules for private companies, and The Companies (Model Articles) Regulations 2008
(SI 2008/3229), Sched 3 para 70 for public companies.
52 D.J.H.Greenwood, ‘The Dividend Puzzle:Are Shares Entitled to the Residual?’ (2006) 32 Journal
of Corporation Law 103, 108.
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by the company.53 As such, a shareholder has no right prior to the declaration of
the dividend, and a right qua creditor immediately after the declaration. Should
someone interfere with the payment of this debt, then reflective loss will not
(following the majority) and should not create a prohibition. Shareholders do
not have advanced rights to receive returns on their capital, either: for private
companies, being most UK companies by number,54 transfer is frequently re-
stricted.55 One of the main features of companies over other business vehicles
is their permanence,56 and minority shareholders normally need some form of
ground to wind up the company,57 making it hard for shareholders to force a
liquidation to return the capital of their investment.
Therefore, for private companies, shareholders cannot be said to have any
form of entitlement to receive funds from the company, or any ability to sell
this uncertain income stream to third parties. As such, statements calling shares
‘property which generates income’,58 with any harm to this causing sharehold-
ers real loss59 need to be reviewed in this light.Frequently, the analysis is limited
to shares issued on public markets.60 The capital market prevents restrictions on
the ability to freely sell shares,61 and provides a public market for such sales
to take place.62 Prices of listed shares are based on market expectations,63 and
53 Contrast Bond v Barrow Haematite Steel Co [1902] 1 Ch 353,where Farwell J held that there was
no right for a shareholder to sue for a dividend in advance of one being declared,with Re Severn
and Wye and Severn Bridge Railway Company [1896] 1 Ch 559, where Romer J held that, upon
its declaration, a dividend became a debt of the company due to the shareholder.
54 Of 4,320,862 companies on the public register as at 31 December 2020, only
6,144 were public companies, see https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/
incorporated-companies-in-the-uk-october-to-december-2020 (last accessed 9 March
2021). Only 1,431 were listed on the London Stock Exchange as at 30 June 2020, see J.
Hardman, ‘UK Companies listed on the London Stock Exchange as at 30 June 2020 by
jurisdiction’ 2020 [dataset] University of Edinburgh at https://doi.org/10.7488/ds/2898 (last
accessed 16 June 2021).
55 See In Re Cawley & Co (1889) 42 Ch D. 209;Charles Forte Investments Ltd v Amanda [1964] Ch
240.
56 M. Eisenberg, The Structure of the Corporation, A Legal Analysis (Washington, DC: Beard Books,
1976) 16; H. Hansmann and R. Kraakman, ‘The Essential Role of Organizational Law’ (2000)
110 Yale Law Journal 387, 413;H.Hansmann,R.Kraakman and R. Squire, ‘Law and the Rise of
the Firm’ (2006) 119 Harvard Law Review 1333, 1394.
57 A special resolution (being one passed by 75 per cent of shareholders) can wind up a company
– Insolvency Act 1986, s 84(1)(b), otherwise the company needs to be not paying its debts, or
a minority shareholder needs to convince the court that it is just and equitable to wind the
company up (Insolvency Act 1986, s 122).
58 Mitchell, n 6 above, 459.
59 Koh, n 20 above, 867.
60 ’When a person buys a share in a trading company in the market, he pays both for a capital asset
(the share itself, which he can sell the next day if he chooses) and for the right to participate in
the future commercial performance of the company’, Sevilleja, n 7 above at [145]. This is based
on Mitchell, n 6 above, 459; and Lin, n 22 above, 539-552.
61 Listing Rules – Financial Conduct Authority Handbook, rule 2.2.4 at https://www.handbook.
fca.org.uk/handbook/LR.pdf (last accessed 9 March 2021).
62 For example ibid, rule 14.2.2, which states a minimum 25 per cent of shares must be in public
hands for a standard listing.
63 R.J. Gilson and R. Kraakman, ‘The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency’ (1984) 70 Virginia Law
Review 549; L.A. Stout, ‘The Mechanisms of Market Inefficiency: An Introduction to the New
Finance’ (2003) 28 Journal of Corporation Law 635; W.H. Beaver, ‘Market Efficiency’ (1981) 56
The Accounting Review 23.
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therefore it has been identified that this creates market pressure to provide div-
idends.64 As such, the abilities to exit your investment and receive a dividend
stream are more likely to occur for such publicly listed companies.
There remains, though, for UK companies,65 no change to the underlying
legal requirements – listed companies face even higher66 restrictions on paying
dividends than private companies. As such, there is never a legal entitlement
for shareholders to receive the income stream on which markets predicate their
expectation of future profits. Indeed,market prices do not decrease by wrongful
acts to the company. Even the most egregious of wrongful act does not cause
such a drop – disclosure of such act to the market does.67 This is why com-
panies are required to disclose matters to the public markets to avoid a false
market being created as they are likely to delay disclosure to avoid such price
drops.68 Non-company specific issues,of course,also result in price drops – such
as industry-specific concerns,or exchange rate movements.69 Indeed, recent re-
search suggests that valuation is more likely to be based on the perceived quality
of management, rather than linked to assets or liabilities of the company.70 This
demonstrates the artificiality of considering that a shareholder qua shareholder
can ever ‘lose’ something when a wrong is done to a company – it could af-
fect income that they could never have a legal entitlement to, and affect the
sentiment others have to the future prospects of the company,which can affect
the price at which they would be willing to purchase the share.71 Company
law generally is keen to hold that a shareholder only has the rights expressly
64 D.R. Fischel, ‘The Law and Economics of Dividend Policy’ (1981) 67 Virginia Law Review 699;
H.K.Baker and R.Weigand, ‘Corporate Dividend Policy Revisited’ (2015) 41Managerial Finance
126;V.Brudney,‘Dividends,Discretion and Disclosure’(1980) 66Virginia Law Review 85;F.Black,
‘The Dividend Puzzle’ (1976) 2 Journal of Portfolio Management 5.
65 In the same way as not all UK companies are publicly listed on the London Stock Exchange,not
all companies listed on the London Stock Exchange are UK companies – see I. MacNeil and
A. Lau, ‘International Corporate Regulation: Listing Rules and Overseas Companies’ (2001)
50 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 787; B.R. Cheffins, ‘The Undermining of UK
Corporate Governance(?)’ (2013) 33 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 503.
66 Companies Act 2006, s 831 provides that a public company cannot make a distribution if its net
assets are less than its called up share capital and undistributable reserves.
67 P. Ormrod and K.C. Cleaver, ‘Financial Reporting and Corporate Accountability’ (1993) 23
Accounting and Business Research 431; L. Sealy, ‘The Disclosure Philosophy and Company Law
Reform’ (1981) 2 The Company Lawyer 51.
68 P.G.Mahoney, ‘Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to Agency Problems’ (1995) 62 University of
Chicago Law Review 1047; J.C.Coffee, ‘Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory
Disclosure System’ (1984) 70 Virginia Law Review 717.
69 ‘Investors are exposed to market uncertainty no matter howmany stocks they hold.’– F.J.Fabozzi
and F.Modigliani,Capital Markets:Institutions and Instruments (Englewood Cliffs,NJ:Prentice Hall,
1992), as quoted in E. Avgouleas, The Mechanics and Regulation of Market Abuse (Oxford: OUP,
2005) at 51.
70 J.J. Park, ‘From Managers to Markets: Valuation and the Shareholder Wealth Paradigm’ (2021)
47 Journal of Corporation Law (forthcoming).
71 For an example of the disassociation between share price and underlying assets, see the recent
GameStop asset bubble caused by reactions to over-exposed short sellers, see J.J. Angel, ‘Game-
stonk: What Happened and What to Do About it’ (2021) SSRN at https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3782195 (last accessed 7 May 2021); D. Valiante, ’GameStop: A
Tragedy Waiting to Happen’Oxford Business Law Blog, 23 February 2021 at https://www.law.
ox.ac.uk/business-law-blog/blog/2021/02/gamestop-tragedy-waiting-happen (last accessed 7
May 2021).
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attached to their shares, and as such are unaffected by changes which do not
affect those legal rights, but do alter (sometimes dramatically) the enjoyment of
those legal rights.72 It would therefore be incongruous to state that a financial
loss qua shareholder in any way constitutes an actionable wrong against third
parties when they have no legal right to receive it in the first place.73
There are many circumstances in which shareholders can suffer actionable
wrongs from third parties.These are not,however, in their capacity as sharehold-
ers.Thus in Johnson, the solicitors in question also provided advice to Mr John-
son, and that was the ground on which he was able to recover qua advisee;74 in
Giles the issue was a shareholder enforcing personal contractual rights held qua
contractual counterparty;75 in Gardner, the court should have differentiated be-
tween the shareholder’s claim qua shareholder, which should have been caught
by the prohibition, and their claim shareholder qua creditor, which should not
have been. By shifting from who holds the claim, to the type of claim held,
additional clarity could have been provided.
Lord Hodge’s judgment was more strident, blaming the confusion on the
prohibition being co-opted by private law.76 He identified that shareholders
obtained a number of advantages, such as limited liability,77 and the residual
claim in the company.78 In exchange, though,minority shareholders risk being
outvoted, shareholders delegate decisions to the board,79 and shareholders have
to be paid after creditors.80 On this basis, from a company law perspective, a
‘bright line’prohibition is principled to deny that a shareholder qua shareholder
suffers any personal loss where the company also does.
The minority disagreed, and instead situated the prohibition squarely in the
private law taxonomical grounding,with the fifth option of a weak private law
rationale. For the minority, double recovery is the key.81 A shareholder does not
72 SeeWhite v Bristol Aeroplane [1953] 2 WLR 144,whereby the issue of new shares with a diluting
effect was held to not affect the rights attaching to the objecting shareholder’s shares,merely their
enjoyment of those rights.
73 Shareholders can suffer non-financial loss, such as being excluded from decision making, or not
receiving information.Technically, remedies are also restricted under the rule in Foss v Harbottle,
n 3 above; Davies, n 1 above. It is frequently argued that shareholders can circumvent this by
raising a personal action against the company to enforce their rights under the articles – see K.W.
Wedderburn, ‘Shareholders’ Rights and the Rule in Foss v Harbottle’ (1957) 15 Cambridge Law
Journal 194; G.D. Goldberg, ‘The Controversy on the Section 20 Contract Revisited’ (1985) 48
MLR 158.
74 Johnson, n 24 above, 36, where Lord Bingham stated of Johnson’s first claim that ‘[t]he claim is
for sums which Mr Johnson, acting on GW’s advice, invested in these companies and lost. This
claim is unobjectionable in principle’.
75 Giles, n 33 above at [19]: ‘Mr Giles and the company were promisees of the same covenants
given independently to each other’.
76 Sevilleja, n 7 above at [95]: ‘[i]n my view the problems and uncertainties which have emerged
in the law have arisen because the “principle” of reflective loss has broken from its moorings in
company law’.
77 Which he states is ‘a consequence of the separate legal personality of the company’, Sevilleja, n
7 above at [102]. This is incorrect – see discussion in J. Hardman, ‘Reconceptualising Scottish
Limited Partnership Law’ (2021) 21 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 179, 211.
78 Sevilleja, n 7 above at [105].
79 ibid at [107].
80 ibid at [108].
81 ibid at [119].
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agree, according to the minority, to ‘stay his hand as regards vindication of his
personal rights of action against a defendant to safeguard theirs’.82 Thus Lord
Sales states that a third party can owe ‘obligations in contract or tort’83 to a share-
holder, and breach of this obligation can reduce the shareholder’s income or the
value of their shares. The examples deployed are Lee v Sheard84 (Lee) (where a
company’s director and shareholder was run over, and so lost dividends),George
Fischer (Great Britain) Ltd vMulti Construction Ltd85 (George Fischer) (where a par-
ent company hired someone to build a warehouse for its subsidiary, and when
that was done negligently, the value of the subsidiary reduced),Gerber Garment
Technology Inc v Lectra Systems Ltd86 (Gerber) (where a parent company held in-
tellectual property rights, and infringement hurt the subsidiary, and the value
of the subsidiary reduced), Barings plc v Coopers & Lybrand87 (where a parent
company hired an auditor, for the parent’s own regulatory purposes, to audit
the entire group, and a faulty audit lowered the value of the subsidiary) and the
New Zealand case of Christensen v Scott88 (where shareholders had guaranteed
the debts of the company, and a wrong to the company reduced the value of
their shareholding).None of these originated qua shareholder – instead arising
qua tort victim, qua contractual counterparty, qua intellectual property holder,
or qua guarantor. As these harms did not arise to the shareholder qua share-
holder, even the majority would agree that the prohibition was not triggered
for most heads of claim under such breaches.
Some heads recovered were qua shareholder. The majority tried to recon-
cile Lee as the company suffered no wrong, only the shareholder, and so the
prohibition was irrelevant.89 However, following Lord Hodge’s judgment, it
would have been neater had they sided with the argument of the wrongdoer’s
counsel in Lee when they argued if a shareholder chose to use a corporate
form, they had to suffer downsides of such corporate form, such as the pro-
hibition applying to any qua shareholder losses.90 This would be even clearer
and brighter. It has been argued that such a clear bright line risks unfairness.91
However, any risk of unfairness can only arise as a result of a deliberate choice
to utilise the corporate form.In each of these cases, a deliberate choice had been
made to structure shareholder income by way of dividend rather than employ-
ment,92 or to create a subsidiary93 or to incorporate a company rather than use
a partnership form.94 Each choice is normally deployed due to an advantage
for the shareholder.95 The reasoning of Lord Hodge is persuasive – obtaining
82 ibid at [125].
83 ibid at [128].
84 n 27 above.
85 n 27 above.
86 n 27 above.
87 [1997] 1 BCLC 427.
88 [1996] 1 NZLR 273.
89 Sevilleja, n 7 above at [44].
90 Lee, n 27 above.
91 Sevilleja, n 7 above at [150] and [167];Watts, n 6 above.
92 For Lee, n 27 above; Johnson, n 24 above.
93 For George Fischer, n 27 above;Gerber, n 27 above;Barings, n 87 above.
94 For Giles, n 33 above;Christensen v Scott, n 88 above.
95 For the choice of income being routed by way of employment income, see J. Prassl, ‘Employee
Shareholder “Status”:Dismantling the Contract of Employment’ (2013) 42 Industrial Law Journal
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such private advantages should carry an inherent risk, and it is wrong to con-
sider such quid pro quo unfair.
THE AUTONOMY OF COMPANY LAW
The majority’s taxonomical grounding provides four important implications
for company law as an academic discipline.First, it strengthens the autonomy of
company law.Academic discourse has concentrated on identifying company law
as a standalone area of legal analysis.96 Yet, paradoxically,97 most company law
theories derive from private law concepts. Thus arguments exist that holding a
share provides a series of contractual rights,98 property rights,99 and/or a mixture
of property rights and contractual rights.100 In each case, a share is reducible to a
series of private law rights. If so, then we must question must whether company
law is actually autonomous,or merely an interlocking series of private law rules.
If the latter, company law could be drastically changed, in unintended ways, by
legal developments in these private law concepts which ostensibly are unrelated
to company law.101
If the minority had carried the day, and the prohibition was merely a part
of the law of obligations and only relevant where there is double recovery,
then the prohibition is purely a matter of private law. Other commentators
have identified that this decision returned the prohibition to company law.102
Even further, though, it boosted the autonomy of company law as it means a
share provides a series of company law entitlements to a shareholder. The case
illustrates, however, that trying to fit these company law concepts within the
private law taxonomical framework risks causing confusion.
307; use of a corporate group is normally driven by choices to minimise liability – see R.Squire,
‘Strategic Liability in the Corporate Group’ (2011) 78 The University of Chicago Law Review 605,
and similarly the use of the corporate form over partnership is likely to be driven to minimise
personal liability – see R.A.Booth, ‘Limited Liability and the Efficient Allocation of Resources’
(1994) 89 Northwestern University Law Review 140.
96 See for example the leading text,R.Kraakman et al,The Anatomy of Corporate Law (Oxford:OUP,
3rd ed, 2017) which implies, in its title, a singular whole to explore the anatomy of.The narrative
often states that market pressure will force convergence of any remaining doctrinal differences
– see H. Hansmann and R. Kraakman, ‘The End of History for Corporate Law’ (2000) 89 The
Georgetown Law Journal 439.
97 Indeed, company law contains a number of paradoxes, see M.T. Moore, ‘Private Ordering and
Public Policy: The Paradoxical Foundations of Corporate Contractarianism’ (2014) 34 Oxford
Journal of Legal Studies 693.
98 For example F.H. Easterbrook and D.R. Fischel, ‘The Corporate Contract’ (1989) 89 Columbia
Law Review 1416.
99 For example J. Armour and M.J. Whincop, ‘The Proprietary Foundations of Corporate Law’
(2007) 27 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 429.
100 R. Grantham, ‘The Doctrinal Basis of the Rights of Company Shareholders’ (1998) 57 Cam-
bridge Law Journal 554; R.C. Nolan, ‘Shareholder Rights in Britain’ (2006) 7 European Business
Organization Law Review 549.
101 See discussion for this interaction between Scots and English law in J. Hardman, ‘Further Legal
Determinants of External Finance in Scotland: an Intra-UK Market for Incorporation?’ (2021)
25 Edinburgh Law Review 192.
102 See A.Tettenborn, ‘Less law is good law? The taming of reflective loss’ (2021) 137 Law Quarterly
Review 16; Davies, n 1 above.
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Second, this autonomy is not endless.A strong company law outcome would
have meant company law’s boundaries are wide, and could interfere with the
general law of obligations where a company interacts with the outside world.
No judgment in this case advocated this. Instead, here the role of company law
was narrowed to the interaction between the company and the shareholder qua
shareholder.Whatever other rights a shareholder may hold will not be affected
by this area of company law. There is a risk that this may expose third parties
to opportunistic moves by shareholders in their other capacities. Perhaps the
autonomy of company law has been won at the expense of its scope.
Third, there is often a debate about the role of shareholders within com-
panies.103 It is argued that they should have enhanced rights in the company
compared to other constituencies,104 and descriptively it is often claimed that
they do.105 As all judgments adopted weak approaches rather than strong ap-
proaches, the special place of shareholders is reinforced.As Lord Hodge pointed
out, shareholders obtain certain benefits from the corporate form.106 It is, there-
fore, right for company law theory to treat shareholders as distinct from other
constituencies and so to have a special place in the theoretical framework for
corporate law.
Fourth, this special place has disadvantages for shareholders. In exchange
for those benefits, again as Lord Hodge identified, shareholders have disadvan-
tages.107 The majority judgment repeatedly stated that the appropriate remedy
for minorities was a derivative claim,108 relief under the equally-criticised109
unfair prejudice regime,110 or to convince a court that it is just and equitable
to wind the company up.111 Thus a qua shareholder claim is materially disad-
vantaged compared to the claims arising in other capacities when interacting
with the company: the law now acknowledges that all other capacities have
the claim, whereas shareholders are precluded from being considered to even
103 This is often phrased in terms of the company’s purpose – whether it should be run to maximise
the financial interests of shareholders alone (for example D.G. Smith, ‘The Shareholder Primacy
Norm’ (1998) 23 The Journal of Corporation Law 277), or whether other constituents should be
considered, see D.Attenborough, ‘Giving purpose to the corporate purpose debate: an equitable
maximisation and viability principle’ (2012) 32 Legal Studies 4.Variations of this discussion arise
in respect of both the appropriate ‘ends’ and also the appropriate ‘means’ to achieve those ends
– see S.M.Bainbridge,The New Corporate Governance in Theory and Practice (Oxford:OUP, 2008).
104 For example it is often claimed that as shareholders hold the ‘residual claim’on winding up, they
are the appropriate constituency to vote on major matters (F.H. Easterbrook and D.R. Fischel,
‘Voting in Corporate Law’ (1983) 26 Journal of Law and Economics 395) and be the ultimate
recipient of fiduciary duties (J.R. Macey, ‘An economic analysis of the various rationales for
making shareholders the exclusive beneficiaries of corporate fiduciary duties’ (1991) 21 Stetson
Law Review 23).
105 For example to discipline directors – see A. Keay, ‘Company directors behaving poorly: Disci-
plinary options for shareholders’ [2007] Journal of Business Law 656.
106 Sevilleja, n 7 above at [105].
107 ibid at [107] and [108].
108 ibid at [71], [81] and [83].
109 See discussion in J. Hardman, ‘The Plight of the UK Private Company Minority Shareholder’
(2022) European Business Law Review (forthcoming).
110 It has been argued that this regime ultimately operates to subvert the prohibition on reflective
loss – see A.K. Koh, ‘Reconstructing the reflective loss principle’ (2016) 16 Journal of Corporate
Law Studies 373.
111 Sevilleja, n 7 above at [34].
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have such a claim qua shareholder unless the company has no claim. Thus, the
special nature of shareholders provides a double edged sword for them: it may
justify shareholders voting on material corporate affairs,112 but does so to the
exclusion of remedies to them.
Thus for company law and shareholders, the case offers good and bad news.
Company law’s autonomy is boosted at the expense of its scope. Shareholders
are special, which can hurt them.Most analysis, though, is unrelated to Marex’s
claim against Sevilleja: no matter which judgment was followed, Marex could
continue their claim. The disagreements between the judgments transcended
the facts of the case, but are of much greater interest.
112 For example Easterbrook and Fischel, n 104 above.
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